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INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"),' the
Southern District of Florida realized jurisdiction over the
Republic of Cuba in Alejandre v. Cuba' ("Alejandre") and held
Cuba liable for the Cuban Air Force's shoot-down of two U.S.-
registered civilian planes over international waters, outside of
Cuba's twelve mile territorial sea.' This comment looks at the
three entities that framed Alejandre and asks first whether
Cuban President Fidel Castro could be arrested or detained for
the shoot-down upon his arrival at the United Nations Summit in
September, 2000. This comment also probes whether the private,
U.S. civilian group, Brothers to the Rescue ("BTTR"), violated
U.S. law, and finally whether the inaction of the United States
gave rise to liability for the shoot-down. The Cuba Triangle is
formed by the interweaving legal and moral obligations radiating
from each of its three corners: Cuba, the United States, and
Brothers to the Rescue. The confusing and dangerous space
defined by the friction between these entities enveloped the slain
pilots, leaving a vacuum of responsibility only partially sealed by
Alejandre.
The FSIA does not address the legal status of heads-of-state.4
The United States recognized Fidel Castro as the head of the
Cuban government on January 7, 1959! Assuming arguendo
that the line of respondeat superior that the district court used in
assigning liability to the Republic of Cuba for the actions of the
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1602-11; § 1605(a)(7) regards a claim:
[11n which money damages are sought against a foreign state for
personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extra-
judicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of
material support or resources (as defined in section 2339A of title 18)
for such an act if such act or provision of material support is engaged
in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting
within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.
See also Alejandre v. Cuba, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 1999). In 1996 Congress
passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), which amended the
FSIA "to provide an additional exception to the general rule that federal courts lack
subject matter jurisdiction over a claim brought against a foreign state." The AEDPA
inserted § 1605(a)(7) to the FSIA in order to provide federal courts jurisdiction over claims
within the parameters set forth in the statute. Id.
2. Alejandre v. Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
3. Id. at 1242-43.
4. In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1988).
5. U.S.-Cuba Relations, at http://www.state.gov/wwwregions/wha/cuba/policy.html
(Sept. 22, 2000).
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Cuban Air Force could be directly connected to Cuban President
Fidel Castro, this comment concludes that the United States
could not legally arrest or detain Castro for the shoot-down when
he visited the United Nations as Cuba's sitting head-of-state.
The exile Cuban-American group, BTTR most likely did not
violate provisions of the Logan Act' or the Neutrality Act,7 though
the group's actions were nearly violations of U.S. law preventing
private interference with foreign policy.
Finally this comment presents analysis of the duty impugned
to the United States for its inaction Factual developments since
Alejandre suggest that the United States may have prevented
the shoot-down, yet the state was not obligated to act, and incurs
no liability for its inaction.
II. BACKGROUND
On Saturday, January 13, 1996 thousands of pamphlets
urging Cubans to resist Castro's government burst from the skies
of Havana. 9 Jose Basulto, ° president of BTTR,1' stated that the
group claimed responsibility for the leaflets, but would not
disclose "technical" details of how the missives were delivered or
distributed." BTTR was known as a group of Cuban exile pilots
that flew numerous missions over the Florida Straits patrolling
for rafters in need of rescue. 3 The group claimed credit for giving
6. 18 U.S.C. § 953 (West 1994).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (West 1994).
8. See The Downing of Brothers to the Rescue Aircraft by Castro's MiGs, at
http://www.hermanos.org/feb24/feb24index.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2000).
9. Juan 0. Tamayo & John Lantigua, A Political Deluge, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 15,
1996. The pamphlets had messages such as "Fight for Your Rights," "The People Own the
Streets, The Government Has the Fear," "Your Neighbors Feel the Same Way You Do,"
"Change Things Now." Id. The pamphlets also had a line from the United Nations
Declaration on Human Rights printed on them. Id.
10. Andres Viglucci, From Guns to Leaflets Over Cuba Activist Seeks Peaceful
Change, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 20, 1996. Basulto is a native of Santiago de Cuba who took
part in the Bay of Pigs invasion. The CIA trained Basulto in warfare, but in the time
preceding the events of Cuba's shooting down of the two BTTR planes, news accounts
portrayed Basulto as a convert to the teachings of Gandhi and Dr. Martin Luther King.
Id.
11. Patrick Smikle, Politics-Cuba: Exile Community Marks "Shoot-Down"
Anniversary, INTER PRESS SERV. (March 1, 1999). For his services, Basulto purportedly
receives a salary of $50,000. 1999 WL 5947292.
12. Tamayo & Lantigua, supra note 9.
13. Id. BTTR has had great success in attracting popular support and donations
from sources such as American Airlines, and accolades from the U.S. Coast Guard for the
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aid and rescue to over 4000 Cuban refugees between 1994 and
1995." Prior to the January 13, 1996 flight, the group conducted
a similar demonstration, entering Cuban air space in violation of
U.S. and Cuban law," and dropping 1000 fliers over Havana in
conjunction with a protest flotilla.'6 In regards to the alleged
January 13th flight over Havana, the Federal Aviation
Administration ("FAA") stated that BTTR had filed no flight
plans for the weekend.'
The Cuban government threatened to intercept or shoot
down aircraft involved in future flights.'" The Cuban government
also filed an official protest with the State Department over the
flights, and in a diplomatic note to the U.S. Interests Section in
Havana voiced concerns over the violations of Cuban airspace."
Basulto in response had hinted at future flyovers, to follow that
of January 13th.2"
On Saturday, February 24th, 1996, Cuban MiG jet fighters
shot down two planes belonging to BTTR over the Straits of
Florida."1 White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry stated
thousands of flight hours that resulted in rescues. President Clinton, however, enacted a
policy of surer repatriation of rafters, thereby slowing the "business" of BTTR. Id. See
also Viglucci, supra note 10. As noted above, BTTR had great success in attracting
private support for their cause. Did the U.S. government support this anti-Castro effort?
See chapter VIII infra.
14. See also Smikle, supra note 11.
15. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295. Both the United States and Cuba are parties to this treaty, which includes
affirmation of a state's sovereignty over the airspace marked by its territorial boundaries.
16. Tamayo & Lantigua, supra note 9. Though the text does not expressly state the
year of this demonstration, it seems to have been July 13, 1995. The FAA filed charges
against Basulto, pending at the time of the article, which could lead to suspension of his
license. Id.; See also John Lantigua & Elaine de Valle, Unraveling How it Happened Was
Line Crossed and by Whom?, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 26, 1996, at I-A. One regulation that
Basulto may have violated is U.S. 19 C.F.R. § 122.153, dealing with flights to and from
Cuba, requiring that a party "clear or obtain permission to depart from, or enter at, the
Miami International Airport, Miami, Florida . . .unless otherwise authorized." BTTR
operated from Opa-Locka Airport. Id.
17. Tamayo & Lantigua, supra note 9.
18. Juan 0. Tamayo, Cuba Rounds up Journalists, Warns Against Future Flyovers,
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 16, 1996. A statement in the Cuban newspaper, TRABAJADORES,
read "Cuba has the means necessary to guarantee the integrity of its national territory,
and to interrupt unauthorized flights in its air space." Id.
19. Juan 0. Tamayo, Cuba Protests to U.S. About Sneak Flights, MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 19, 1996.
20. Viglucci, supra note 10, at IA.
21. Martin Merzer & Manny Garcia, MiGs Down Two Exile Planes Off Cuban
Waters, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 25, 1996, at 1A.
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that the two planes were engaged "near the territorial waters of
Cuba."22 At that time, U.S. Coast Guard and Navy planes and
helicopters joined a Navy cruiser and several other vessels to
search for the crewmen, F-15 fighters scrambled from a Tampa
air base to provide cover for the operation. The U.S. Coast Guard
received word of the downing at 3:45 p.m. from the FAA.23 Cuban
officials did not release a statement immediately.
24
Local FAA authorities had issued new advisories on Cuba,
warning against crossing the 24th parallel, noting that Cuba had
stated that it would not be responsible for personal security.
28
Other articles stated that Cuba had warned that planes caught
in Cuban airspace would be shot down.2" Cuba, after the shoot-
down, claimed to have warned the BTTR planes not to cross the
24th Parallel. 7
Accounts of the events that day differed. A BTTR pilot not
on the February 24th mission claimed, "At no time did they veer
into Cuban airspace. It was a search-and-rescue mission. I
guarantee you they were in international waters."28 A Pentagon
official told The Associated Press that there were some signs that
the planes were heading to Cuba, possibly to pick up persons and
fly them out of the country.29 McCurry stated that the three
planes had filed flight plans designating the Bahamas as their
destination, and that flight plans with Cuba as a destination
would have been denied." Basulto claimed that the planes had
changed their mind in mid-flight and redirected to look for Cuban
rafters."' U.S. officials reported that the Cubans radioed the
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. The 24th parallel divides the water between Key West and Cuba and marks
the limits of Cuba's air traffic control. Id.
26. Henri Cauvin, A Bold and Risky Cat-And-Mouse Game, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 25,
1996, at 12A.
27. John Lantigua & Elaine de Valle, Unraveling How it Happened Was Line
Crossed and by Whom?, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 26, 1996, at 1A.
28. Elaine de Valle, Downed at Cuba's Door MiGs Blast 2 Exile Planes Close to
Cuba, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 25, 1996, at 1A.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. Three BTTR aircraft "deviated from the route given in their [Visual Flight
Rules] flight plans; they were flying within the [Danger area designated by Cuba] . . .
within Havana [Flight Information Region] promulgated as being active on 24 February
1996." Id.; see also ICAO Council Concludes Consideration of the Report on the 24
February 1996 Shootdown of Civil Aircraft Off Cuba, Attachment B, Conclusions J 3.11,
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three planes and warned that the area was dangerous, and
demanded that they remain north of the 24th parallel. 2 A senior
U.S. administration official claimed that the MiGs made no effort
to contact the three planes or escort them from the area before
requesting permission to shoot them down.33 U.S. Secretary of
State Warren Christopher called the shoot-down "a blatant
violation of international law." 4
Leading into the facts of the shoot-down, United States,
BTTR, and Cuba asserted three diverging versions of the
events.35  The Cuban government claimed that the planes
violated its territory twice that Saturday, with the planes
reaching as close as five miles from the coast." The Cuban
government claimed that at 3:15 p.m. the two planes were in the
restricted zone of Cuban airspace, heading toward Havana.37
The U.S. version showed the planes north of the limit at 3:20
p.m., though Basulto's plane had penetrated three miles into
Cuban airspace by 3:22 p.m. Basulto claimed, "None of us were
in Cuban airspace."39 Outside of the trial, Cuba made no claim of
where the planes actually were when shot down, but a U.S.
administration official offered: "When the two other planes were
shot down they were not in Cuban airspace. I know they may
have come close to being in Cuban airspace prior to this time, but
I have no information to indicate that they actually entered
Cuban airspace." A U.S. statement later noted "the lead U.S.
plane that returned safely to Opa-Locka did enter Cuban
airspace."4" A later testimonial from an American official
speaking on the condition of anonymity included the comments:
"We have radar tracks" and "[t]here's no ambiguity there."4'
at http://www.icao.org/icao/enlnr/pio9606.htm (visited 10/18/00).
32. Valle, supra note 28, at 1A.
33. David Lyons, International Law Experts: No Basis For Attack, MIAMI HERALD,
Feb. 26, 1996, at 10A.
34. Id.
35. Lantigua & de Valle, supra note 27, at IA.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Christopher Marquis & Martin Merzer, America Agonizes Over Options Military
Retaliation Unlikely, Officials Say, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 26, 1996, at IA. Basulto
vehemently denied the report, saying "That is a lie." 1d.
[Vol. 32:2
THE CUBA TRIANGLE
U.S. officials decried as false the Cuban government claim
that the downed planes were five and eight miles off the Cuban
coast. 2 Cuban air traffic controllers made mistakes in the past,
incorrectly informing BTTR pilots that they were in Cuban
airspace. 3
The Southern District of Florida accepted the factual account
filed by the plaintiffs which was the International Civil Aviation
Organization's ("ICAO") report to the United Nations on the
shoot-down." The conclusions of the ICAO report include
findings that Cuba notified U.S. authorities of multiple violations
of Cuban territorial airspace on seven specific dates between May
15, 1994 to April 4th, 1995, demanding the U.S. adopt measures
to end the violations, and making a public statement on July 14,
1995, warning that any aircraft intruding into Cuban territorial
airspace may be shot down.4 '5 The report further confirmed that
at least one BTTR aircraft overflew Havana at a low altitude on
July 13th, 1995, releasing leaflets and religious medals.6
Though the report commended BTTR for its volunteerism and
rescue efforts, it concluded that "[tihere was evidence to indicate
that some members of the group sought to influence the political
situation in Cuba." 7 Of the two planes shot down, neither was
closer than nine nautical miles to the limit of Cuba's territorial
airspace when attacked, in other words both planes were over
international waters."
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
45. ICAO Council Concludes Consideration of the Report on the 24 February 1996
Shootdown of Civil Aircraft Off Cuba, Attachment B, Conclusions T 3.1, 3.3 at
http://www.icao.org/icao/en/nr/pio9606.htm (visited 10/18/00) [hereinafter ICAO Council].
46. Id. at 3.2. The aircraft was identified as BTTR's N2506. The report reported
the statement of a BTTR pilot that on the flights of January 9th and 13th, half a million
leaflets were released outside Cuba's twelve nautical mile territorial airspace. Id. at
3.4. The author watched testimony from a BTTR member in the alleged Cuban spy trial
at the time ofwriting that indicated BTTR craft used global positioning system hardware
to track their locations during these and other flights.
47. Id. at$l 3.7.
48. Id. at$l 3.17.
20011 327
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III. ALEJANDRE V. REPUBLIC OF CUBA
In December 1997, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida held that the Cuban government was
liable for the deaths of the four pilots. 49 The court stated that the
pilots were conducting a routine humanitarian mission,
searching for Cuban rafters in the Florida straits."° The court
also held that the killing was "without warning, reason, or
provocation."5
Of paramount significance in Alejandre is the fact that Cuba
refused to make an appearance, and therefore presented no
defense. 2  The Southern District accepted the plaintiffs'
uncontroverted factual allegations, the ICAO report."3 Under the
FSIA, however, the plaintiffs were required to establish their
right to relief for the court." The opinion did not mention BTTR's
flights to Havana in the past, and the court simply accepted the
contention that this particular mission was a humanitarian
mission to the Florida straits.5 In at least one news account,
Basulto claimed that the flight was originally set for Bahamas,
but the planes changed direction, mid-way, heading for the
straits instead. 6 Though BTTR offered first the explanation that
the flights were to Bermuda, the group had contacted Havana
prior to leaving Opa-Locka Airport for notification that they
would be crossing the 24th parallel 7
The MiGs did not utilize any of the established means to
warn or escort the two planes out of the area, the only warning
came from the Havana air controller in the form of the warning
not to dip below the 24th parallel.0 The court looked to the
49. Alejandre v. Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1253 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1243. The Southern District of Florida cited Thomson
v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104 (1885), and Nishimatsu Const. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515
F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) on this matter. Id.
54. 28 U.S.C. §1608(e) ("No judgment by default shall be entered by a court ...
unless the claimant establishes his right or claim to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
court.") (West 1994).
55. See generally Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. 1239.
56. Valle, supra note 28, at IA.
57. Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1243.
58. Id. at 1246; see also ICAO Council, supra note 45.
328 [Vol. 32:2
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Convention on International Civil Aviation,5 to which both the
United States and Cuba are parties, for codification of the
6D
measures.
The United Nations Security Council, the European Union,
U.S. politicians and legal scholars6 quickly declared that the
murders were brutal and unjustified under international law as
they were committed against civilian aircraft." The district court
relied on the June 1996, extensive report by the International
Civil Aviation Organization for several key pieces of evidence,"
produced during its detailed investigation.64
District courts have original jurisdiction to hear suits against
foreign states, provided that some exception to sovereign
immunity applies to the case. 5 Through the FSIA," Congress
granted federal courts subject matter jurisdiction for a claim
against a foreign state if the claim was one of several
enumerated exceptions. 7 The exception relied upon in Alejandre
was a product of the AEDPA, which, one month after the shoot-
down, added suits in U.S. courts against states engaged in acts of
terrorism to the FSIA's exceptions to foreign sovereign
immunity." Specifically, the FSIA allows this new exception in a
case where:
59. Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (prohibiting the use of force against
a civilian plane, even after that plane has entered foreign airspace); see also Kay
Hailbronner, Freedom of the Air and the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 490, 514 (1983).
60. Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1246, n.3.
61. David Lyons, International Law Experts: No Basis For Attack, MIAMI HERALD,
Feb. 26, 1996, at 10A. Early critics of Cuba's acts were U.S. Secretary of State Warren
Christopher, Professors Carl McKenry and Bernard Oxman from the University of Miami
School of Law.
62. Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1247.
63. Id. at 1244-46 (evidence included the transcript of the Cuban Air Force pilots'
communications).
64. Id. at 1247.
65. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1994)).
66. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983), citing
H.R.Rep. No. 94-1487, p.7 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 6604
("Congress passed the [FSLA] in order to free the Government from the case-by-case
diplomatic pressures, to clarify the governing standards, and to 'assur[e] litigants that ...
decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due
process.'")
67. Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1247; citing 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611.
68. Id.; (citing AEDPA, Pub.L. No. 104-132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); see also, 22
U.S.C.A. § 6021 (14) (West 2000) ("The Castro government threatens international peace
and security by engaging in acts of armed subversion and terrorism such as the training
and supplying of groups dedicated to international violence.").
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[Mioney damages are sought against a foreign
state for personal injury or death that was caused
by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft
sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of
material support or resources for such an act if
such act or provision of material support is
engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of
such foreign state while acting within the scope of
his or her office, employment, or agency."
The court also noted that the United States must have
"designated the foreign state as a state sponsor of terrorism
pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of
1979. "7o
The court was satisfied that (1) the shoot-down was an
"extra-judicial killing,"" (2) the Cuban Air Force was acting as an
agent of the Republic of Cuba when shooting down the two
planes, (3) Cuba was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism72
at the time, and (4) the shoot-down took place over international
waters." The court stated that these four points satisfied the
requirements for the exception to foreign sovereign immunity
under the FSIA.v4
The plaintiffs made their substantive claim for damages
based on another 1996 statute, the Civil Liability for Acts of
69. Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1247 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(7)). The court
noted that AEDPA's amendments to the FSIA applied retroactively in this case. Id. at
n.4.
70. Id. at 1248.
71. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350, note (1994) (as defined by the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 stating "the term 'extra-judicial killing' means a deliberate killing
not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.").
72. 31 C.F.R. Part 596 (1996) (Cuba was one of seven states named a state sponsor
of terrorism in the Export Administration Act of 1979).
73. Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1248. Plaintiffs were able to bring in "undisputed and
competent evidence" that the shoot-down was over international waters. Id. The crew
and passengers of a cruise ship and a private fishing vessel gave evidence that the planes
were flying away from Cuba, and were in international air space when attacked. Id.
Additionally, the court looked to the ICAO Report to support these assertions. The twelve
mile permissible boundary that Cuba may claim as territorial sea finds its establishment
in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 7, 1982, art. 3, U.N. Doc.
AICONF 62/122 (1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982). Id. at n.7.
74. Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1248.
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State Sponsored Terrorism ("Civil Liability Act").7  The Civil
Liability Act creates, in this case, a cause of action against the
Cuban Air Force, and the Republic of Cuba, through the doctrine
of respondeat superior.7' There was no cause for discussion of
whether Castro or any other Cuban official could be arrested or
detained for the acts of the Cuban Air Force.
The court awarded the plaintiffs compensatory and punitive
damages, totaling $187,627,911, against the Cuban Air Force and
Cuba and "against any of their assets wherever situated."77
President Clinton had used frozen Cuban assets to make a
humanitarian gesture of $300,000 to each of the plaintiffs
families. 78  But in October 1998, President Clinton, citing
"national security concerns .. . invoked a waiver blocking the
families from collecting their judgments from frozen assets," even
though he had charged Congress to "pass legislation that would
provide immediate compensation to the families, something to
which they are entitled under international law, out of Cuba's
blocked assets here in the United States."79 Deputy Treasury
Secretary Stuart E. Eizenstat stated that Clinton had not
envisioned the legislation would finally pass."
In October 1998 pursuing Cuban commercial assets in the
United States, the plaintiffs had filed a writ of execution of final
judgment against AT&T.81  In November 1998, plaintiffs filed
writs of garnishment against eleven U.S. telecommunication
carriers for payments directed to Empresa de
Telecomunicaciones ("ETECSA"). 2 The district court ruled that a
75. Id. at 1249 (The Civil Liability Act, Pub.L. 104-208, § 589, 110 Stat. 3009,
supported this claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 note on CIVIL LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF STATE
SPONSORED TERRORISM (West. Supp. 1997)).
76. Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1249; see also, Alejandre, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1321,
n.3 (S.D. Fla. 1999) ("The FSIA defines an 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state'"
as an entity "which is a separate and legal person, corporate or otherwise." An agent can
also be an official of a foreign state.); see also, Skeen v. Federative Republic of Brazil, 566
F. Supp. 1414, 1417 (D.D.C. 1983) ([A] respondeat superior statute, providing an
employer (the foreign state) with liability for certain tortuous acts of its employees.").
77. Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1253-54.
78. Laurence Arnold, Terrorism Victims Seeking Damages, AP ONLINE, Oct. 27,
1999, 1999 WL 28132933.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Alejandre, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1325.
82. Sean D. Murphy, ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law: State Jurisdiction and Jurisdictional Immunities, 94 AM. J. INT'L L.
102, 121 (Jan. 2000).
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1998 amendment to the FSIA allowed the plaintiffs to garnish
the assets without a license from the U.S. Office of Foreign
Assets Control." The court also held that ETECSA was an
"agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" under the FSIA
sufficient to satisfy the intention of Congress. 4 The Eleventh
Circuit vacated this judgment and remanded the case with
instructions to dissolve the writs of garnishment directed at
amounts owed to ETECSA.8 5
On October 11, 2000, the Senate unanimously passed The
Justice of Victims of Terrorism Act," enabling the plaintiffs to
collect approximately ninty-seven million dollars including
compensatory damages from the judgment, and sanctions from
non-diplomatic Cuban holdings in the United States.87 The funds
came specifically from revenue paid by AT&T for Emtel Cuba,
held in Chase Manhattan Bank.88
IV. OPERACION ESCORPION89
The legal proceedings in the Alejandre cases served only to
identify one corner of the Cuba Triangle. Before legal analysis of
the part played by the United States or BTTR, this comment
must present the facts that came to light following Alejandre.
On Friday, February 23, 1996, the day before Cuba shot
down the two BTTR planes, Juan Pablo Roque disappeared with
his best suits, leaving behind a car, a wallet, and a wife."5 In
83. Id. The telecommunications carriers and the U.S. had attempted to quash the
writs. Id.
84. Alejandre, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1336, 1343; see also Murphy, supra note 82, at 120-
24.
85. Alejandre v. Telefonica Larga Distancia de Puerto Rico, Inc., 183 F.3d 1277,
1290 (11th Cir. 1999).
86. Murphy, supra note 82, at 121. Senators Connie Mack and Frank Lautenberg
introduced the bill, which "sought to allow the attachment of, and execution against, any
assets of a foreign terrorist state, including moneys due from, or payable by, the United
States, even if held by a subdivision or instrumentality of the state. Id. The President
could waive the provision only with respect to execution against premises of a foreign
diplomatic mission, or funds held in the name of the mission necessary to meet its
operating expenses." Id.
87. Vanessa Bauza, New Bill Will Aid Victims of Foreign Terrorism, SUN-SENTINEL
(Ft. Lauderdale), Oct. 13, 2000, available at 2000 WL 22201726.
88. Jay Weaver, Fliers' Relatives Getting Cuba's Millions, U.S. Approves Release of
Money in Shoot-down Suit, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 13, 2001, at IA.
89. LAROUSSE SPANISH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 496 & 300 (1994) (In English:
"Operation Scorpion.")
90. William Booth, Defector's Return Baffles Exile Community; Many Suspect Pilot
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1992, Roque defected to the United States from Cuba by
swimming across Guantanamo Bay to the U.S. naval base.9'
Roque's defection followed eighteen years of service in the Cuban
Air Force as a Soviet-trained fighter pilot. 2 When Roque arrived
in Miami, the Cuban exile community welcomed him. The
conservative Cuban American National Foundation even
published his book, "Defector," which included a foreword by
Basulto.93 The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), the CIA
and other intelligence officials debriefed Roque at the time of his
defection; Roque maintained a link to the FBI, occasionally
offering up information on BTTR or other exile groups in active
opposition to Castro." Roque surfaced the weekend of the shoot-
down, on Cuban television, denouncing BTTR as "CIA dupes and
terrorist provocateurs," plotting the assassination of Castro."
On May 7, 1999, a grand jury in the Southern District of
Florida produced an indictment against alleged Cuban agents,
including Roque." The May indictment followed an earlier
indictment, September 1998, and brought the total to fourteen
alleged Cuban agents.97 The group was engaged in what was
code-named "Operation Scorpion," an assignment to goad BTTR
into the shoot-down." The indictment charged that the agents
received a warning six weeks earlier not to fly with BTTR, which
Was Agent of Castro Who Fooled Loved Ones and U.S. Government, WASH. POST, Feb. 28,
1996; see also Philip Delves Broughton, International: Spy's Bride sues over 'rape,' THE
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 19, 1999, 1999 WL 23224608 (Ana Margarita Martinez
annulled her marriage to Roque and sued the Cuban government for "rape" on the basis
that the marriage was the product of "fraud and concealment," thereby making the sex
nonconsensual.)
91. Booth, supra note 90.
92. Id.
93. Id.; see also Patrick Smikle, Politics-U.S. /Cuba: A Tale of Defection, Deception
and Death, INTER PRESS SERV., May 16, 1999, 1999 WL 5948639. Roque's book lambasted
Cuban government officials as "fat communists" and "heavy bear [sic] drinkers," and
contained photographs of Roque with Congressional representatives Robert Menendez of
New Jersey and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida. Id.
94. Booth, supra note 90.
95. Id.
96. Dana Calvo, Jay Weaver, & Luisa Yanez, Cuban Spies Linked to Shootdown
Indictment Says Ring Tried To Manipulate FBI, Legislators, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), May 8, 1999 at 1A. A member of the Cuban Mission to the U.N. was
expelled for his/her alleged link to the Cuban agents - one of three expelled from the
Cuban Mission to the U.N. in December of 1998. Id.
97. Id. (One of the original defendants, Gerardo Hernandez, was also charged with
conspiracy to commit murder in relation to the shoot-down.)
98. Id.
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they were to convey the warning to other Cuban agents."
Richard Nuccio, a former member of the Clinton administration
and advisor on Cuba, suggested that the shoot-down was an
incident intended to interfere with Cuba-U.S. relations.
100
In the context of Alejandre, the indictment charged that the
attack on BTTR was set in motion on January 29, 1996, when the
Cuban Directorate of Intelligence gave its Miami-area spies
notice of the expected confrontation between the Cuban Air Force
and BTTR."' One of the agents had infiltrated BTTR by
February 13, 1996, and was leaking information about the
group's flight plans to other agents."' The mole was instructed to
avoid the upcoming flights, but if he was not able to avoid the
flights, he was instructed to use "specific phrases" over the air to
supposedly ensure his safety.0 3  Based on the information
gathered by the mole, the Cuban Directorate of Intelligence
ordered its agents not to fly with BTTR from February 24-27,
1996.1
4
Federal prosecutors struck deals with five of the alleged
spies, who plead guilty to charges of not registering as foreign
agents."' Four others are believed to be in Cuba, and the
remaining five are on trial at the time of writing.
While these facts lend de facto support to the plaintiffs' case
against Cuba, the interactions between the United States and
the alleged agents raise questions. What was the duty of the
United States to act or intervene in the interest of the pilots'
safety? How much did the United States know of the impending
attack? If the knowledge that can be imputed to the United
States is quantifiable, is the value of that knowledge sufficient to
charge the United States with failure to fulfill a duty to the
citizens murdered by Cuba? Basulto thought so, and brought his
case to the House of Representatives."7
99. Id.
100. Id. Nuccio's role and actions are discussed below, see infra, chapter VIII.
101. Calvo, Weaver, & Yanez, supra note 96.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. U.S. Prosecutors To Visit Cuba, AP ONLINE, Sept. 30, 2000, 2000 WL 27213424.
106. Id.; see also United States v. Hernandez, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (S.D. Fla. 2000)
(the court ruled that pretrial publicity was not sufficient to warrant a change of venue).
107. See Gibson, infra note 116 and accompanying text.
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V. THE UNITED NATIONS MILLENNIUM SUMMIT
In New York City, just days before the United Nations
("U.N.") Millennium Summit in 2000, President Castro's plan to
attend or to not attend the conference became a matter of
popular speculation. 8 Earlier, Castro had elected not to attend
the 1999 World Trade Organization ministerial conference in
Seattle when Cuba received indications that the United States
would not grant the necessary travel visas. 9 Cuban exiles in
Miami had called for Castro's arrest before the Seattle
conference. ' The United States had denied a visa for Ricardo
Alarcon, President of the National Assembly of the People's
Power of the Republic of Cuba."' Before the Millennium Summit,
however, the Cuban Foreign Ministry announced that the Cuban
Personal Security Directorate, the U.S. Secret Service and the
New York Police had drafted a program of activities.
The United States has never arrested a head of state
attending a meeting of the U.N."' Even so, prior to the
Millennium Summit politicians and some Cuban exiles called on
the federal government to arrest Castro upon his arrival in New
York City. '14
Since the shoot-down, politicians have attempted to seize
upon the public outrage. In 1996, less than one month after the
shoot-down, "Congress urge[d] the President to seek, in the
International Court of Justice, indictment for this act of
terrorism by Fidel Castro.""' Three years later, Florida
Representative Bill McCollum stated: "After a review of the
evidence by the Subcommittee on Crime, I have reached the view
that Fidel Castro should be indicted for his role in the Brothers
108. Patricia Grogg, Politics-Cuba: Castro to Defy Threat of Arrest in U.S., INTER
PRESS SERV., Sept. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4092557.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Host Country Committee Meets at Request of Permanent Mission of Cuba, U.N.
Press Release HQ/604 (Aug. 29, 2000); see also Host Country Committee Hears Legal
Opinion Concerning Issuance of Visas to Participants in Conference of Heads of National
Parliaments, U.N. Press Release HQ1605 (Sept. 1, 2000).
112. Grogg, supra note 108.
113. Summit is Not About Castro, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Sept. 6, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 22195099.
114. The Downing of Brothers to the Rescue Aircraft by Castro's MiGs, at
http://www.hermanos.org/feb24/feb24index.html.
115. 22 U.S.C.A. 6045(b)(3) (1996).
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to the Rescue shoot-down." 6  Representative McCollum
pressured the Clinton administration to consider Basulto's plea
and evidence in support of an indictment against Castro from the
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida."7 In 2000,
Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart, a Miami Republican of
Cuban descent, called on the Justice Department to indict Castro
for ordering the Cuban Air Force to shoot down the two BTTR
planes."' Representative Diaz-Balart drew on the International
Convention Against Torture, ratified by the United States on
October 20, 1994, in asking President Clinton and Attorney-
General Janet Reno to arrest Castro."' In New York, Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani revealed that BTTR had consulted with a
mayoral aide, pushing the city to file murder charges against
Castro for shooting down the aircraft.2 Giuliani recommended
that BTTR take the case to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. 2'
It is important to note that the United States observes the
principles of customary international law.' A critical component
of customary international law for the purpose of this article
concerns the degree to which the United States respects
sovereign and diplomatic immunity within its borders. There is
not a standard in customary international law for determining
the degree of head-of-state immunity that applies to U.S.
116. William E. Gibson, Exile Group's Leader Says U.S. Allowed Shootdown Brothers
to the Rescue Chief Wants Castro Indicted for Murder of 4 Men, SUN SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), July 16, 1999 at 16A. Former Rep. McCollum's quote was made while he
chaired the House Subcommittee on Crime. Id. Basulto had traveled to Washington to
present a dossier of purported evidence that demonstrated that the Clinton
administration "had prior knowledge of Castro's intentions. It also [questioned] certain
actions and omissions, such as the interruption of defense mechanisms precisely during
the time that the shootdown occurred." Id.
117. Id.
118. Summit is Not About Castro, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Sept. 6, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 22195099.
119. Grogg, supra note 108. Scholars have debated the merits of further amending
the FSIA to include human rights violations. See Stephen J. Schnably, Bernard H.
Oxman, ed., International Decisions: Alejandre v. Cuba, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 751, 773
(October 1998); but see Ismael Diaz, Comment, A Critique of Proposals to Amend the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to Allow Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns for Human
Rights Violations, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 137 (2001).
120. Ikimulisa Sockwell-Mason et al., The Day Whole World Came to New York City,
N.Y. POST, Sept. 6, 2000, available at 2000 W'L 25111243.
121. Id.
122. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (describing the role and influence
of customary norms of international law, concluding "[i]nternational law is part of our
law").
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jurisprudence. 12 3
Notwithstanding the maze of notions of diplomatic or head-
of-state immunity, both federal and New York state officials are
bound by the direct guidelines of the United Nations' 1947
Headquarters Agreement 24 ("1947 Treaty") with the United
States. The 1947 Treaty reads, in pertinent part:
The headquarters district shall be inviolable.
Federal, state or local officers or officials of the
United States, whether administrative, judicial,
military or police, shall not enter the headquarters
district to perform any official duties therein
except with the consent of and under conditions
agreed to by the Secretary-General. The service of
legal process, including the seizure of private
property, may take place within the headquarters
district only with the consent of and under
conditions approved by the Secretary-General.'
The above Section 9 precludes the service of process or action
against Castro on the grounds of the United Nations site. The
protection is extended in Section 11:
The federal, state or local authorities of the United
States shall not impose any impediments to transit
to or from the headquarters district of: (1)
representatives of Members or officials of the
United Nations... (5) other persons invited to the
headquarters district by the United Nations or by
such specialized agency on official business.2 6
Finally, Section 12 precludes the intervention of domestic public
policy built on the events of Alejandre: "The provisions of Section
11 shall be applicable irrespective of the relations existing
between the Governments of the persons referred to in that
section and the Government of the United States." 7  The
language of Section 12 disfavors the molestation of any of the
123. Jerrold L. Mallory, Note, Resolving the Confusion Over Head of State Immunity:
The Defined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 179 (1986). There are differences
between sovereign immunity, diplomatic immunity and state official immunity. Id.
124. United Nations Headquarters Agreement, signed June 26, 1947, U.S.-U.N., 11
U.N.T.S. 11, T.I.A.S. No. 1676 (in force Nov. 21, 1947).
125. Id. at art. III, Sec. 9(a).
126. Id. at art. IV, Sec. 11.
127. Id. at art. IV, Sec. 12.
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described officials by a private cause of action. Consequently, in a
1997 incident between a Russian Federation diplomat and New
York City police officer, the United Nations affirmed the
importance of the host country's securing and observing
diplomatic immunity.' Without even considering Castro's status
as the sitting Cuban head-of-state, the 1947 Treaty precludes the
arrest of the Cuban leader and the service of process upon him.
VI. THE U.S. ACTION AGAINST NORIEGA
The notion of detaining or arresting, or serving Cuban
President Fidel Castro during his stay in New York for the U.N.
Millennium Summit raises notable contrasts with the actual U.S.
action against General Manuel Antonio Noriega. Noriega was
the dictator of Panama until a U.S. invasion pulled him from
power.129 The United States justified the action as legal and
necessary to halt Noriega's illegal drug trafficking in the United
States, which amounted to more than $700 million. 3 ° The U.S.
action against Noriega is relevant because it provides a contrast
for the rare situation where the United States will pursue and
seek to justify an action against a head of state.
Protestors responding to the BTTR shoot-down raised the
comparison to the Noriega case in the media, demanding a
stronger response to the shoot-down than the U.S. action against
Noriega."' The facts of United States v. Noriega... ("Noriega"),
however, are significantly distinguishable from Alejandre.
Further, the controlling law, as set forth by the Eleventh Circuit,
does not support an effort to arrest or detain Castro in the
United States, or even from Cuba, for the shoot-down.
In Noriega, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Noriega could be extradited through military force to the United
States to stand trial on various domestic criminal charges.'33 Yet
Noriega does not establish a precedent sufficient to enact a
128. Host Country Committee Considers Question of Privileges, Immunities of
Diplomatic Community, United Nations Press Release HQI579/Rev.l* (Nov. 5, 1997).
129. Steve Fainaru, Noriega's Shadow Still Falls in Panama, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
17, 1990.
130. Id.
131. Fabiola Santiago, Exiles Demand Tough U.S. Action; Carnaval Canceled, MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 26, 1996, at IA; see also, Gibson supra note 116.
132. United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997).
133. Id.
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similar seizure of Castro, either in the United States or from
Cuba. Noriega challenged his drug trafficking convictions on five
grounds."' Noriega's assertion of head-of-state immunity is
significant here.
The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Noriega's assertion of head-
of-state immunity for several reasons. Noriega argued that he
was the de facto, if not de jure head-of-state for Panama.3 ' But
the Eleventh Circuit, like the district court below, dismissed
Noriega's claim to head-of-state immunity in part because the
United States never recognized Noriega as the "legitimate,
constitutional ruler" of Panama.' In contrast, Castro seems to
benefit from official recognition as Cuba's head-of-state from the
United States.137
The Eleventh Circuit discussed The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon,"3 in which the Supreme Court held that nations,
including the United States, "had agreed implicitly to accept
certain limitations on their individual territorial jurisdiction
based on the 'common interest impelling [sovereign nations] to
mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each
other."'13 9 The Court in The Schooner Exchange stated that one of
the most significant exceptions to jurisdiction was "the exemption
of the person of the sovereign from arrest or detention within a
foreign territory."4 ' The Eleventh Circuit traced the principles of
international comity and elements of the doctrine of foreign
sovereign immunity to The Schooner Exchange.' The asserted
power of the U.S. courts led foreign sovereigns to follow a course
of procedure and representations to the U.S. State Department,
clarifying their claim of immunity." As a result of this trend,
the courts looked, generally, to the Executive Branch in
determining whether to exercise jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns and their respective instrumentalities.'
134. Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1211.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. U.S.-Cuba Relations, at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/cuba/policy.html
(Sept. 22, 2000).
138. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812).
139. Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1211; citing The Schooner Exchange, at 137.
140. Id. (alteration in original).
141. Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1211.
142. Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 581 (1943).
143. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
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The passage of the FSIA in 1976 "codified the State
Department's general criteria for making suggestions of
immunity, and transferred the responsibility for case-by-case
application of these principles from the Executive Branch to the
Judicial Branch."' However, the FSIA addresses neither the
notion of head-of-state immunity, nor sovereign immunity from
criminal prosecution, so the Eleventh Circuit chose to base its
determination regarding Noriega's claim of immunity on the
Executive Branch's direction.'45 The court discussed the three
forms of the guidance: the Executive Branch (1) expressly
endorses immunity, (2) expressly declines to suggest immunity,
(3) or offers no guidance at all."4 6 Where the Executive Branch
offers no guidance, the court noted that it has been held that the
purported head of state should not receive immunity. 1'4 7 In
between the two extremes, the Fifth Circuit held that the court
should make an independent determination of immunity.148
The Eleventh Circuit in Noriega observed that "[tihe
Executive Branch by pursuing Noreiga's capture and this
prosecution has manifested its clear sentiment that Noriega
should be denied head-of-state immunity."'49 The court also
looked to the record, and observed "Noriega never served as the
constitutional leader of Panama, that Panama has not sought
immunity for Noriega and that the charged acts relate to
Noriega's private pursuit of personal enrichment."5 ' Finally, the
court drew on In re Doe, which states that there is "respectable
authority for denying head-of-state immunity to a former head-
of-state for private or criminal acts." 5'
The Second Circuit's holding in In re Doe concerns criminal
charges under federal law against Ferdinand Marcos, the former
president of the Philippines. 5' Similar to the situation of
Noriega, the foreign state did not call for the defendant's head-of-
state immunity, in fact the Philippine government issued a
144. Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1212 (citing Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 488.
145. Id. (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 248 (2d Cir. 1995)). See generally,
Mallory, supra note 123, at 170-78.
146. Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1212.
147. Id. (citing In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988)).
148. Id. (citing Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 618-19 (5th Cir. 1974)).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing In re Doe, 860 F.2d at 45 (2nd Cir. 1988)).
152. In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 42 (2nd Cir. 1988).
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diplomatic note waiving "any residual sovereign, head of state, or
diplomatic immunity that former Philippine President Marcos
and his wife . .. may enjoy under international and U.S. law,
including, but not limited to, Article 39(2) of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations," by virtue of their former
offices .. .
The Second Circuit held that a state can waive sovereign
immunity, and the Philippines did so in that diplomatic note."'
In coming to this determination, the Second Circuit considered
the general international rule of the head-of-state immunity
doctrine, and drew from several scholars."' The court observed
that "absolute foreign sovereign immunity" was recognized until
1952 when the U.S. State Department announced in a letter that
it would suggest immunity for public acts, but would withhold
suggestion in cases involving private acts.
Without guidance from the Executive Branch, the Second
Circuit held that a court is left to determine whether a head-of-
state enjoys immunity. 8 The court, however, conceded that the
Judicial Branch "is not the most appropriate one to define the
scope of immunity for heads-of-state," because the Constitution" 9
invests in Congress the power "to define and punish ....
Offenses against the Law of Nations."' The court further noted
that Article II of the Constitution grants the President the
general field of foreign relations, and in the Executive Branch
greater expertise has crystallized into a Branch of government
better equipped to react and adapt to "conflict between individual
private rights and interests of international comity ....
The respective separation of powers is illustrated by this
tension in Alejandre, when President Clinton subsequently
moved to prevent the plaintiffs' families from collecting a
153. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 39(2), done at Vienna Apr. 18,
1961 (Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 1972. T.I.A.S. 7502).
154. In re Doe, 860 F.2d at 43.
155. Id. at 45.
156. Id. at 44. See e.g. Mallory, supra note 123.
157. In re Doe, 860 F.2d at 44.
158. Id. at 45 (citing Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1945); Victory Transport,
Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 358-359 (2d
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965)).
159. U.S. Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
160. In re Doe, 860 F.2d at 45.
161. Id.
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judgment against Cuban holdings. As the power of the
Legislature to define the scope of immunity concerns the problem
considered here, In re Doe fails to give a certain answer, for the
holding is limited to former heads-of-state, where the foreign
state has posited an affirmative waiver of immunity for that
person."'
Similar to Noriega, In re Doe involved the Executive Branch
pushing for prosecution, indicating willingness by the State
Department and Executive Branch to find an exception to head-
of-state immunity. In contrast to Noriega, in In re Doe, the
defendants were not seized from a foreign state by the federal
government, but were residing in the United States of their own
volition.'64 This circumstance provides a better comparison to the
event of Castro voluntarily visiting the United States for the
U.N. Millennium Summit. However, In re Doe is still
distinguishable, because Marcos was a former head-of-state
residing in the United States, while Castro visited the United
States not only as a sitting head-of-state, but while in the course
of performing his duties as Cuba's head-of-state.
As the Second Circuit noted, Congress has a stake in
defining the immunity of a head-of-state, but it has been held, as
noted above, that the FSIA does not determine the immunity or
the subsequent liability of sitting heads-of-state.'1"
Though the federal government has not paused in decrying
the rule of Castro, 6 and though the United States has supported,
and may continue to facilitate attempts at overthrow of his
rule,' the United States did not move to seize Castro from Cuba
in a retaliation that would have matched the conviction of
President Clinton's words of reaction to the shoot-down. To the
contrary, both the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch
facilitated Castro's visit: one member of Congress and the U.S.
162. Alejandre v. Cuba, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
163. In re Doe, 860 F.2d at 45.
164. Id. at 42.
165. Id. at 44.
166. U.S.-Cuba Relations, at http://www.state.gov/www/regionwha/cuba/policy.html
(Sept. 22, 2000).
167. Sullivan v. C.I.A., 992 F.2d 1249, 1253-54.
168. Speech of Pres. Clinton, Feb. 26, 1996, cited in Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 42
F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1320 ("We must be clear: this shooting of civilian aircraft out of the air
was a flagrant violation of international law. It is wrong and the United States will not
tolerate it.").
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Secret Service cooperated with Cuba in forming the program for
Castro's visit to the U.N.9 Castro suspected that the United
States would deny a travel visa for him, as was the case for
Ricardo Alarcon, president of the Cuban National Assembly, who
also had planned to visit the U.N. Summit.7 '
As previously noted, efforts were made to compel New York
authorities to arrest Castro upon his arrival for the U.N.
summit.171 An arrest of Castro by New York State authorities
would have been unconstitutional, for the state would be acting
in either (1) the span of inaction by the federal government,
which indicated no willingness to arrest Castro, or (2) in
contravention of the federal government's facilitation of Castro's
presence and inclusion in the U.N. Summit. In either case, the
unconstitutionality of such intervention arises where the state
authority usurps the President's constitutional authority to
receive foreign diplomats under Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution.
President Clinton justified his waiver of the requirements to
comply with the Alejandre plaintiffs' judgment with this same
constitutional clause.' The Eleventh Circuit, in this phase of
the case, discussed the Executive's claim that interference with
any Cuban property in the United States would adversely affect
his ability to conduct diplomatic relations with states sponsoring
terrorism. "' The Eleventh Circuit declined to rule whether 28
U.S.C. § 1610(f)(1)' 74 was constitutional, in part because the
plaintiffs in Alejandre were not attempting to attach diplomatic
or consular property, and therefore not creating an impediment
to the President's Article II, Section 2 powers.
7 5
169. Grogg, supra note 108. Washington Congressman Jim McDermott was in direct
contact with Castro and promoted the visit. Id.
170. Id.
171. Ikimulisa Sockwell-Mason et al., The Day Whole World Came to New York City,
N.Y. POST, Sept. 6, 2000, available at 2000 WL 25111243.
172. Alejandre, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1324.
173. Id.
174. This section of the FSIA potentially allows attachment of certain diplomatic
property to a judgment.
175. Alejandre, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1332 n.17.
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VII. BROTHERS TO THE RESCUE: PRIVATE INTERFERENCE
WITH U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Since Castro's rise to power, the U.S. government has
strictly controlled U.S. citizens' ability to travel to Cuba.176 In
United States v. Laub,'77 a group of students organized a trip to
Cuba, with a plan to circumvent the U.S. State Department's
restriction on travel to Cuba by following a circuitous travel
route.178  The district court held first that the "national
emergency" barring travel to Cuba had not expired; second, that
the trip did not constitute a criminal act under 8 U.S.C. §
1185(b); and third, that the legislature had the duty to fill gap. 7 '
In addition to restrictions on the U.S. citizens' travel to
Cuba,8 0 there exist flight regulations. 8 ' The United States has
regulated private intercourse with Cuba in its push for
democratic reform. The flights by BTTR bypassed the U.S.-made
insulation, piercing the veil between private parties and Cuba,
thereby wrinkling U.S. foreign policy. Basulto himself has
described the BTTR flights as "civil disobedience," similar to the
actions of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'82 In order to determine
the legal repercussions of BTTR's interference with U.S. foreign
policy, this portion of the comment looks specifically at the Logan
Act and the Neutrality Act.
A. The Logan Act
In 1799, amid a power struggle between the Federalist and
Republican parties, the Logan Act'83 was born.' The Logan Act
176. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965). (Court held
that due process was not violated where the Secretary of State denied travel to Cuba
based on "foreign policy considerations affecting all citizens." Id. at 13.).
177. United States v. Laub, 253 F. Supp. 433 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
178. Id. at 434, 436.
179. Id. at 460.
180. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.420(a) (restricting U.S. citizens' travel and transactions in
and with Cuba).
181. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.709 (restricting operations to Cuba).
182. David Cazares, Defense Blasts Cuban Exiles, Feb. 2, 2001, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), at 3B. On a tape made by South Florida television station WTVJ, Basulto is
seen dropping flares near Havana stating, "This is an act of civil disobedience," and "We
realize what we're doing. All we're doing is signaling out to the Cuban people that civil
disobedience is possible." Id.
183. 18 U.S.C.A. § 953 (West 1994).
184. Kevin M. Kearney, Comment, Private Citizens in Foreign Affairs: A
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prohibits private correspondence with foreign governments. The
act reads as follows:
Any citizen of the United States, wherever he may
be, who, without authority of the United States,
directly or indirectly commences or carries on any
correspondence or intercourse with any foreign
government or any officer or agent thereof, with
intent to influence the measures or conduct of any
foreign government or of any officer or agent
thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies
with the United States, or to defeat the measures
of the United States, shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
This section shall not abridge the right of a citizen
to apply, himself or his agent, to any foreign
government or the agents thereof for redress of any
injury which he may have sustained from such
government or any of its agents or subjects. 
18
5
As late as 1987, one article noted that throughout the history
of the Logan Act, there has been only one indictment and no
prosecutions."' The one indictment under the Logan Act was
never tried; it was against a Kentucky farner, who wrote a
newspaper article advocating the western territory of the United
States "form a new nation allied to France."87
The Logan Act has been bandied about in dicta by U.S.
courts... and by embattled politicians.' The specter of the act
Constitutional Analysis, 36 EMORY L.J. 285, 303 (1987). With a rich history of the Logan
Act, Kearney "examines the tangled history of private intervention into areas usually
reserved for public diplomacy, with an intent to illuminate the question of whether
prohibitions on the ability of American citizens to communicate with foreign governments
are appropriate under our constitutional system." Id. at 286.
185. 18 U.S.C.A. § 953 (West 1994). In 1994, Congress amended the act, taking out
the monetary fine of $5000, which had been a part of the statute since its inception,
though the maximum imprisonment term remained three years. Id.
186. Kearney, supra note 184, at 287.
187. Id. at 303 (citing Vagts, The Logan Act: Paper Tiger or Sleeping Giant? 60 AM. J.
OF INT. LAW 268, 292 (1982)).
188. See id. at 303-06.
189. Id. at 285. In 1984, President Reagan commented to the press that Reverend
Jesse Jackson's meetings with Castro, the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua, and with
Syrian officials to free a U.S. pilot may have been violations of the Logan Act. Id. at 285
(citing Reagan Contends Jackson's Missions May Violate Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1984,
at 1, col. 6.).
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vanishes upon the political alignment of such factors as "popular
and official opinion" of the private party's activities, and success
in those activities.' 90
Case law on the actual application of the Logan Act is
particularly slim.'9 1 To investigate this matter, it is necessary to
first set aside Kearney's argument against the validity of the
Logan Act, 92 in order to assume that the act is valid and
prosecutable.
The Logan Act is to be enforced with lenity because of the
vagueness of its terms.'9 The elements of the Logan Act may be
paraphrased as follows: (1) the person must be a U.S. citizen, (2)
acting without U.S. authority, (3) directly or indirectly
corresponding with any foreign government, (4) intending to
influence the conduct of that government, (5) in relation to any
dispute or controversy with the United States.
Several members of BTTR are or were U.S. citizens.
Further, they were not acting under the authority of the United
States. Yet BTTR was not necessarily communicating with
Cuban officials, but rather with the people of Cuba. This effort
could constitute an indirect communication with the government
of Cuba. There is not enough evidence to demonstrate that
BTTR intended to influence the conduct of Cuba. At the most, it
can be argued that the actions of BTTR did promote a disruption
between the United States and Cuba.
The first element of the Logan Act is its application to the
conduct of U.S. citizens overseas, or "wherever he may be."'94 In
United States v. Peace Info. Ctr., ' the district court of the
District of Columbia cited the Logan Act in dicta, supporting its
190. Kearney, supra note 184, at 286.
191. See id. at 287.
192. See id. at 303; see also, Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., Ltd., et al., 231 F.
Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (deciding not to rule on the issue of the Logan Act's
constitutionality based on the act's tension with the Sixth Amendment for its vague and
indefinite language).
193. Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., Ltd., et al., 231 F. Supp. 72, 89 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) (citing Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 (1955) (stating ambiguity should be
resolved in favor of lenity)); see also United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d. Cir.
1964).
194. United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1329 (3rd Cir. 1993); see also United
States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1001 (5th Cir.1977) ("the legislative authority of the
United States over its own citizens extends to conduct by Americans on the high seas and
even within the territory of other sovereigns.").
195. United States v. Peace Info. Ctr., 97 F. Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1951).
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decision to deny a motion to dismiss an indictment under the
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 ("FARA")." 6 According
to the court, Congress' inherent power to regulate external
affairs included the power to enact FARA."'
The Executive also has the power to regulate the private
individual, even from afar. In Haig v. Agee,' Chief Justice
Burger held that the U.S. Secretary of State has the extended
authority of the U.S. President to revoke a passport on the
ground that the holder's activities in foreign countries are
causing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national
security or U.S. foreign policy."' Haig defines the public policy
concerns of the Executive Branch necessary to enforce the Logan
Act against BTTR.'5°
The second question of relevance is whether BTTR
communicated with the Cuban government. It may matter that
BTTR's communications were directed toward Cuban citizens, as
opposed to taking the form of efforts to intervene in traditional,
diplomatic arteries of communication."' As suggested above, this
communication may be found to constitute an indirect
communication between BTTR and Cuba. Cuba indeed "got the
message." This assertion is evidenced from Cuba's call for U.S.
intervention to control the group."'
Where the acts of a group of private citizens prompted Cuba
to demand action by the United States, it seems that BTTR
196. 22 U.S.C.A. § 611 et seq.; see also Peace Info. Ctr., 97 F. Supp. at 258. FARA
"requires every agent of a foreign principal to file a registration statement with the
Attorney General setting forth certain information specified in the statute." Id.
197. Peace Info. Ctr., 97 F. Supp. at 261. The defendants were indicted for their
failure to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 their agency for a
foreign principal. Id. at 258. The citation to the Logan Act followed in the court's
doctrinal rationalization. Id. at 261.
198. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
199. Id. at 286.
200. Id. at 296. This policy support has its roots set as far back as President
Theodore Roosevelt, who in 1903 empowered the Secretary of State with the discretion to
refuse to issue passports to persons "likely to embarrass the United States," or who were
"disturbing, or endeavoring to disturb, the relations of this country with the
representatives of foreign countries." Id. In 1918, Congress followed this rule with a
travel control statute, though it was concerned with the "transference of important
military information." Id. at 296-97.
201. The slippery slope argument on this issue may pose the question, "Would a
mass-sending of electronic mail from a private party in the United States to citizens in
another state likewise constitute a violation of the Logan Act?"
202. ICAO Council, supra note 45.
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affected Cuba's conduct in relation to the United States.
Arguably, U.S. response was inaction, but the manner and
degree to which BTTR's private acts precipitated intercourse
between the two states goes past the concern of the Logan Act
and speaks to the question of interference by BTTR with foreign
policy.
20 3
There is simply not enough evidence to conclude that BTTR
intended to affect relations between the United States and Cuba.
Without this element, the BTTR activities did not constitute a
violation of the Logan Act. The group, however, may have
interfered with U.S. foreign policy.24 To investigate another legal
restriction on private diplomacy this comment next considers the
Neutrality Act.
B. The Neutrality Act
The initial U.S. Neutrality Act, "enacted in 1794, outlawed
private warfare, and gave the President and Congress (rather
than private citizens) the power to make foreign policy."2 5
Congress repealed the original act in 1918, but U.S. citizens'
involvement with the Spanish Civil War prompted today's
Neutrality Act.0 6 The purpose of the Neutrality Act of 1939
sought to regulate private exportation of arms and ammunition
and other materials intended for foreign war efforts during
periods of national emergency.0 7 The Neutrality Act reads, in
pertinent part:
Expedition against friendly nation:
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly
begins or sets on foot or provides or prepares a
203. Of course, taken to the extreme this line of argument would support the
conclusion that any extradition case, where two states must engage one another, possibly
as the result of a public act, may be a violation of the Logan Act. So there must be a
threshold where the effect of private actions rises to a level of degree sufficient to irritate
the relations of two states. That level is not determined in this comment.
204. Assuming that BTTR was ideologically aligned with the United States against
Cuba, the degree to which BTTR "interfered" with U.S. foreign policy is reduced. So
synchronized, and with U.S. acquiescence, BTTR's acts actually assumed the color of U.S.
foreign policy. See chapter VIII infra.
205. Montgomery Sapone, Have Rifle With Scope, Will Travel: The Global Economy of
Mercenary Violence, 30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 29 (Fall 1999).
206. Sapone, supra note 205, at n. 165.
207. United States v. One N. Am. Airplane et al, 197 F.2d 635, 636-37 (3rd Cir. 1952).
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means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part
in, any military or naval expedition or enterprise to
be carried on from thence against the territory or
dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any
colony, district, or people with whom the United
States is at peace, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than three years, or both. °8
Application of the last element requires a determination of
whether the United States is "at peace" with Cuba. Under one
scholar's reading of the treatment of this "at peace" element by
U.S. courts, the U.S. embargo of Cuba may preclude a finding
that the United States and Cuba are "at peace" for the purpose of
this provision."9 Those remaining elements demand that (1) the
action commenced in the United States, (2) was knowingly
conducted or organized, and (3) had a military or naval
character.
BTTR's action did commence in the United States, so the
first element is satisfied. Further, BTTR publicly demonstrated
the intention of committing acts of "civil disobedience" in relation
to the Cuban government, thereby satisfying the second element
that action be knowingly conducted or organized. The third
element presents a more difficult problem, in that the action
must be military or naval in order to rise to the level of a
violation of the Neutrality Act.
Prosecutions under the Neutrality Act include a botched
attempt to export an airplane to Europe,"' a conspiracy to
dynamite the Welland Canal in Canada, 1' inducing and
recruiting persons to participate in the Spanish Civil War,12 and
a private action under the Ethics in Government Act212 for the
U.S. Attorney General to investigate President Reagan for an
alleged violation of the Neutrality Act in Dellums v. Smith. 4 In
dicta of Dellums v. Smith, the court adopted the conclusion from
a memorandum from the U.S. Department of Justice1. that a
208. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (West 1994).
209. Sapone, supra note 205, at 33-36.
210. One N. Am. Airplane, 197 F.2d at 635-36.
211. United States v. Tauscher, 233 F. 597, 598 (D.C.N.Y. 1916).
212. Schware v. Board of Bar Exam. of State of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 237 (1957).
213. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (West 1994).
214. Dellums v. Smith, 577 F. Supp. 1449, 1450 (N.D.Cal. 1984).
215. Id. at 1452 n.2; The memorandum for Phillip B. Heymann re Applicability of the
Neutrality Act to Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (Oct. 10, 1979) was
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provision of the Neutrality Act is not violated when "CIA agents
serve as troops in the employ of a foreign military service."216 In
United States v. Johnson,17 defendants were charged with
conspiracy to injure the property of a foreign government, British
helicopters, under Title 18, U.S.C. 956.218 Title 18 U.S.C. 956 had
originally been "part of the Neutrality Act of 1917.... The stated
purpose of the Act of 1917 was to punish acts of interference with
the foreign relations. . .of the United States."19
The two defendants in United States v. Ramirez220 were
prosecuted for conspiracy to violate and actual violation of the
Neutrality Act.221  The two men were of a group of thirteen
soldiers training for a takeover of Haiti.222 A federal informant,
holding himself out as a Texas millionaire looking for favorable
treatment from a new Haitian government, entered an
agreement with the defendants to supply weapons, locate a
training site, and provide logistical support and funds.' The
defendants argued that they were victim to selective prosecution
on the basis of their Haitian origin and their political views,
namely favoring revolution in Haiti.224  In contrast, the
defendants argued, "regular violations of the Neutrality Act take
place both at the behest of the present administration and
through private individuals and groups. The defendants argued
that those alleged Neutrality Act violations are not prosecuted
because those violations comport with the foreign policy of the
present administration."225 The sort of private group to which the
defendants in Ramirez were alluding could include the BTTR.
From the outset of the Havana flights, BTTR promoted
human rights, democracy, but also advocated a revolution in
Cuba, albeit a peaceful one.2 6 The elements of a violation of the
Neutrality Act are present in BTTR's activity up to the question
submitted by the defendants in Dellum. Id.
216. Id.
217. United States v. Johnson, 738 F. Supp. 591 (D.Mass. 1990).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 592.
220. United States v. Ramirez, 765 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1985).
221. Id. at n.1.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 438.
225. Id.
226. See ICAO Council, supra note 45 at 3.7. See also Tamayo & Lantigua, supra
note 9 and accompanying text.
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of whether the absence or presence of armament determines if
the expedition assumes a "military or naval"2, 27 character. The
pertinent part of the Neutrality Act in this respect reads: "any
military or naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from
thence against the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or
state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the United
States is at peace."
228
In United States v. O'Sullivan,229 a case involving an
expedition to Cuba, the Southern District Court of New York
held that for the "enterprise" to take on a "military or naval"
character, there must be the intent to conduct or aid hostile
efforts against a foreign sovereign or state, and that intent
manifests the commencement of the act. Another case involving
an expedition to Cuba, United States v. Hart,"' set forth further
criteria231 defining what constitutes a "military expedition" under
the Neutrality Act:23'
For the purposes of this case it is sufficient to say
that any combination of men, organized in this
country, to go to Cuba and make war upon its
government, provided with means, - with arms
and ammunition, - (this country being at peace
with Cuba,) constitutes a military expedition. It is
not necessary that the men shall have been drilled,
or put in uniform, or prepared for efficient service,
nor that they shall have been organized according
to the regulations which ordinarily govern armies.
It is sufficient that they shall have combined and
organized in this country as a body, to go abroad,
and as such make war on the foreign government,
having provided themselves with means to do so. If
they have thus combined and organized it is not
necessary that the arms shall be carried upon their
227. 18 U.S.C. § 960.
228. Id.
229. United States v. O'Sullivan, 27 F.Cas. 380, 381, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1851).
230. United States v. Hart, 78 F. 868 (E.D.Pa. 1897).
231. Id. at 869. (The conviction seemed to rest on the prosecution satisfying two
prongs: "To justify a conviction it must be proved that a military expedition was organized
in this country; and that the defendant provided means here, in Pennsylvania, for
assisting it on the way to Cuba, as charged, with knowledge that it was such an
expedition." Id.
232. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (West 1994).
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persons here, or on their way; it is sufficient that
arms have been provided for their use when
occasion requires.' 3
The strict test for a "military expedition" proposed in United
States v. Hart does not, when applied to the known facts
regarding BTTR's flights over Havana, indicate that any of the
excursions were military expeditions. Of course, this conclusion
rests on the element of the standard that requires the presence of
arms at some point in the activity. Evidence on this matter is
limited to allegations that BTTR was developing makeshift
weapons in an effort to support an overthrow of the government
in Cuba."
The absence of arms may not preclude violation under the
Neutrality Act. The intention of the flights and the flyers was to
advocate an uprising against the Republic of Cuba, albeit
"democratic" and "peaceful."" To find BTTR in violation of the
Neutrality Act would require a broad interpretation of the act.
VIII. ROUNDING OUT THE TRIANGLE: THE (IN-)ACTION OF THE
UNITED STATES
Discussion of U.S. action or inaction completes the triangle.
The motivating questions behind this discussion flare up from
the hints that the White House and U.S. military had notice that
(1) Cuba was preparing to fire upon subsequent BTTR flights
below the 24th parallel; (2) BTTR intended to make another
flight over Havana;236 (3) in flight, the BTTR pilots were straying
from their declared course; and finally, (4) the United States had
the opportunity to warn BTTR or intercept the Cuban MiGs, and
233. Hart, 78 F. at 869-70.
234. This allegation was made by the defense in United States v. Hernandez, 106 F.
Supp. 2d 1317 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (the alleged Cuban spy trial taking place at the time of
writing). See also David Cazares, Defense Blasts Fliers' Motives Rescue Mission Was
Political, Attorney Says Pilots Accused of Inciting Cuba, Feb. 6, 2001, SUN-SENTINEL
(Ft. Lauderdale), at 3B. Counsel for the defense drew testimony from a member of BTTR
indicating that around the time of the shoot-down, the group was developing flares from
plastic pipes which would be dropped to rafters. Id. The witness also stated that BTTR
was experimenting with 12-gauge ammunition, firing it from the pipes. Id.
235. See Tamayo & Lantigua, supra note 9; see also Cynthia Corzo, 'Brothers' Gives
Money to Democratic Groups in Cuba, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 14, 1996, at 2B. BTTR also
has attempted to send money to Concilio Cubano, an association of pro-democracy
organizations. Id.
236. ICAO Council, supra note 45, at T 3.3, 3.9,3.10.
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failed to do either.
The evidence available, in particular the evidence asserted
by BTTR, addresses the four questions above and imputes the
U.S. military and administration with sufficient knowledge to
have anticipated the shoot-down."' The U.S. government
certainly had notice, knowledge, and should have expected the
shoot-down. Yet assuming the United States had the ability to
intervene at some point, when, if ever, did the United States
have a duty to act, and what would be the extent of the action?
While a FAA investigation of Basulto and BTTR was
grinding on,"' the group was scheduling more flights, and hinting
at another trespass into Cuba,239 the flight which brought the
confrontation. Only after the shoot-down, the FAA announced
stricter punishments for U.S. pilots penetrating Cuban
airspace."' The FAA claimed it would use "all available
government radar sources" to monitor violations of Cuban
airspace, violators would be met upon landing and their licenses
would be revoked.241 One editorial charged that BTTR had been
filing "phony" flight plans for two years and the U.S. government
had not reacted.4
237. The Downing of Brothers to the Rescue Aircraft on February 24, 1996: Summary
of Unanswered Questions Prepared by Brothers to the Rescue (BTTR) (BTTR asserts,
specifically, 11 questions) at http:/www.hermanos.org/feb24/questions.html.
238. Don Phillips, FAA Cracks Down on Airspace Violators; Pilots Who Penetrate
Cuba Limits Can Forfeit Licenses and Aircraft, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1996 at A04. Cuban
authorities had cited nine instances in which BTTR had violated its airspace between
May, 1994 and January of 1996. Id.; See also Jefferson Morley, FAA Asked To Restrict
Airspace at O's Game; Flyover Feared As Cubans Play, WASH. POST, April 24, 1999 at
B01. Three years after the shoot-down, Major League Baseball made a request to the
FAA that it not allow BTTR to do a flyover of Oriole Park in Baltimore during a game
featuring the Cuban national team. Id. BTTR's attempt to drop leaflets near the Mar.
28, 1999 game in Havana was disrupted by an unscheduled FAA inspection that recalled
BTTR's planes and inspected the two planes' cargo: half of a million leaflets. Id.
239. Viglucci, supra note 11.
240. Don Phillips, FAA Cracks Down on Airspace Violators; Pilots Who Penetrate
Cuba Limits Can Forfeit Licenses and Aircraft, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1996 at A04. The
announcement came 13 days after the shoot-down. Id.
241. Id. This new measure was announced in a letter to 33,225 pilots in South
Florida. Id. The FAA letter stated: "Airmen should be aware that if the evidence
obtained from any source establishes a violation of Cuban airspace, their airmen
certificates will be revoked on an emergency basis. In addition, maximum civil penalties,
seizure of aircraft and judicial remedies will be pursued in appropriate cases." Id. Flying
without a license opens the pilot up to criminal penalties that threaten up to three years
in prison and a $100,000 fine. Id.
242. Wayne S. Smith, Editorial, Downed Planes Had Fair Warning, Jan. 11, 2001,
WASH. POST, at A26.
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The FAA proclaimed that it would use every governmental
radar source. 4 ' This claim implies cooperation and even
orchestration with the U.S. military if it possesses any applicable
radar sources. If the U.S. military's resources could later be
utilized to monitor the activities of U.S. pilots, why were they not
used before the shoot-down, when the FAA was aware of the
threat to BTTR?
The United States may have been able to prevent the shoot-
down. Prevention could have taken the form of radiobroadcast
warnings, or at the extreme,2 actual intervention or interception
by U.S. military aircraft. Though extreme, intervention would
constructively impress the U.S. military into defending Cuban
airspace, but where the lives of U.S. citizens are at stake, would
this not be an acceptable form of policing should the situation
require a severe U.S. response?
The lament of "too little, too late" describes the U.S. response
to Alejandre. Although a policing administrative agency, the
FAA, should not be held responsible for the tragic choices of
BTTR or for the extra-judicial killing by the Cuban Air Force, the
fact that the FAA knew of the past trespasses of Cuban airspace,
and had been warned of future flyovers, should have hastened
the investigation into Basulto's flights, or at the least led to a
temporary grounding of BTTR. The complacency of the FAA and
the remedial measures taken after the shoot-down betray a
seeming governmental acquiescence towards the trespasses of
BTTR. Additionally, the FBI may have deciphered missives to
the Cuban spies alluding to the impending shoot-down. 4' The
State Department and the Defense Intelligence Agency received
a warning from a delegation of retired U.S. military officers who
met with members of the Cuban general staff that the next BTTR
violation would lead to a shoot-down." Where the transgression
is in line with administrative leanings, and those private parties
seem willing to independently advance the more subversive
aspects of aggressive foreign policy, the United States may be
more inclined towards acquiescence than enforcement of its laws.
243. See Phillips, supra note 240.
244. The extreme situation would be one similar to that of Alejandre, where the U.S.
military is imputed with knowledge of the scrambling of Cuban fighter craft.
245. See Smith, supra note 241.
246. Gail Epstein Nieves, Admiral: Cuba hinted of attack on Brothers, March 7, 2001,
MIAMI HERALD at lB.
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The evidence asserted by BTTR does not demonstrate that
the United States intended for BTTR to engage in their flights or
that it directly supported BTTR trespasses into Cuba. The
purported history of U.S. covert activity in Cuba would, however,
support such a contention. Consider Sullivan v. C.LA.,"7 a
daughter brought an action against the CIA to disclose records
concerning the disappearance of her father, presumably in the
course of a flight over Cuba to drop anti-Castro propaganda. 48
Similarly, in United States v. Lopez-Lima,"4 s the defendant fought
against a charge of aircraft piracy, where he had hijacked a plane
at gunpoint and forced it to Cuba, claiming his actions were
under the authority of the CIA as part of its continuing efforts to
gather intelligence of Castro's activities."' Additionally, history
reveals that U.S. foreign policy towards Castro's Cuba has
utilized similar subversive tactics. The tone and intent of U.S.
relations towards Cuba has been acutely hostile.25'
The United States engaged in hundreds of sabotage
missions; its covert operations to stifle Cuba's economy and
contribute to an ousting of Castro demanded an annual budget of
as much as $100 million."' In December, 1961, President
Kennedy commenced "Operation Mongoose," an escalation of the
"secret war" against Cuba.25  Operation Mongoose saw a
command post set up in Miami under the guise of the radio
station, (JM-WAVE), from which a 300-person staff handled the
activities of 2000 Cuban agents with a budget over fifty million
dollars.254 The United States sponsored assassination attempts,
including efforts to place a bomb in a location at which Castro
regularly went skin-diving, giving Castro a "contaminated"
diving suit, and providing one would-be assassin with some sort
of weapon disguised as a pen.5
247. Sullivan v. C.I.A., 992 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1993).
248. Id. at 1251.
249. United States v. Lopez-Lima, 738 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
250. Id. at 1406.
251. See MORRIS H. MORLEY, IMPERIAL STATE AND REVOLUTION; THE UNITED STATES
AND CUBA, 1952-1986, 146-55 (1987).
252. Id. at 147. The efforts involved included acts of economic sabotage, such as
burning sugar cane, and even assassination attempts. Id. at 148.
253. Id. at 149.
254. Id. at 149-50. Operation Mongoose tasks were more aggressive than the
previous acts of sabotage and included the destruction of Cuban infrastructure, bridges,
oil refineries, sugar mills, and fowl stock. Id.
255. Id. at 154. This "would-be" assassin, Rolando Cubela, a Cuban army major, was
eventually cut off from support in June, 1965, for what may have been Cuban intelligence
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The failed Bay of Pigs Invasion was only the first bubble in
the broth of U.S. aggression against Castro.256 At the resolution
of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962, President Kennedy
vowed to "Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev that the United
States would not invade Cuba," however, the United States
devised further attempts to assassinate or overthrow Castro.257
When the U.S. Defense Department released approximately 1500
declassified documents, sealed due to the Kennedy assassination,
an abandoned U.S. plan to invade Cuba lay bare.25
The Pentagon's schemes included relatively subversive
tactics.5  Past these subversive measures, the Pentagon
entertained "Operation Bingo," which was comprised of a set of
recommendations received by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March
9, 1962, and intended to fabricate the pretext for a U.S. invasion
of Cuba.6' The recommendations proposed "A Remember the
Maine" incident, 6' staging a terrorist attack by sinking a boat
carrying Cuban refugees fleeing to Florida,262 or the "downing of a
U.S. military plane or even a crowded civilian airliner by Cuban
fighter jets."26
The similarity between these "Operation Bingo"
recommendations and the actual transgressions by Cuba is
frighteningly ironic. The degree of similarity also scores
interference or simply ineffectiveness. Id. The Johnson Administration curtailed covert
activity in Cuba. See id. at 147, 151-55.
256. See id. at 135-46.
257. Christopher Marquis, Pentagon Hatched Plots, Cuba Invasion Plan, MIAMI
HERALD, Nov. 19, 1997, at lA.
258. Id.
259. Id. Examples include: "Operation Good Times," a plan to airdrop "doctored"
photographs "of an obese Castro with two beauties in any situation desired . . . a table
brimming over with the most delectable Cuban food with an underlying caption .... such
as 'My ration is different.'" Id. Others included "Operation Free Ride" "aimed at creating
unrest by airdropping valid one-way airline tickets in Cuba," with destinations to Mexico,
Caracas, etc., but not the United States; "Operation True Blue," the use of Florida-based
transmitters to cut into Cuban radio and television broadcasts to berate Castro and others
in an effort win the minds of the Cuban people. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. ("Under this ruse, the Pentagon would blow up a U.S. ship in Cuban waters
and blame Cuba, mirroring the incident that ignited the 1898 Spanish-American War.")
262. Cuba Found Guilty in Tugboat Sinking, The Associated Press, SUN SENTINEL
(Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 8, 1996, at 18A. In 1996, "laIn agency of the Organization of
American States... found Cuba guilty of sinking a hijacked tugboat... and drowning 41
of the 72 refugees aboard," in a 1994 incident that sparked a 36,000-person exodus to
Miami. Id.
263. Marquis, supra note 257.
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provocative the alleged U.S. acquiescence, begging the question
of what benefit the United States could gain from such "Cuban"
acts before the Alejandre shoot-down. For example, the post-
"Operation Bingo" benefit of strong domestic and strong
international disfavor towards Cuba may have served as the
prelude to the national state of mind necessary for the passage
and adoption of the Helms-Burton Act.264 Similarly, the shoot-
down may have opened the door for a U.S. military strike.
According to the former advisor to President Clinton on Cuba,
Richard Nuccio, two days after the shoot-down, Clinton
considered a retaliatory strike against Cuban airfields.6 5  John
Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, could not guarantee
zero U.S. casualties and the plan was abandoned. 66
Three days earlier, the White House received independent
notice of the Cuban threat to BTTR, as well as BTTR's plan to
make another flight toward or to Havana. On February 23, 1996,
the night before the shoot-down, Nuccio sent a memo to the
White House warning of a possible confrontation between BTTR
and Cuban forces. 67 Nuccio did not believe a shoot-down was
imminent, but his concerns were raised by the FAA's inability to
keep Basulto from flying. 2 8  The U.S. State Department had
informed the FAA on February 23, 1996 that BTTR might soon
mount another flight into Cuban airspace, and warned of the
likelihood of Cuban military response."" Then the FAA
264. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785. The extraterritorial provisions of the Helms-Burton act
"spurred formal protests from the international community, which condemned the Act as
violating both customary international jurisdictional rules and the GAI'. Canada,
Mexico and the European Union adopted 'blocking' and 'clawback' legislation, barring
their companies from complying with Helms-Burton, prohibiting the enforcement of
judgments entered under the Act, and authorizing companies to countersue for any
damages resulting from the U.S. sanctions measure. The OAS Inter-American Juridical
Committee unanimously condemned Helms-Burton as an international law violation in a
decision which the U.S. member joined. Canada and Mexico pursued dispute resolution
mechanisms under NAFTA, and the European Community formally initiated dispute
resolution proceedings in the WTO." Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S.
Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 60 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
265. Lewis Dolinsky, Inside View of 2 Fateful Decisions, S.F. CHRON. Mar. 3, 2000, at
A14.
266. Id.
267. Ex-Aide: White House Warned Before Shootdowns By Cuba, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
Feb. 22, 1999. The memo was sent via electronic mail at 6:44 p.m. but the recipient,
Sandy Berger, did not read it that evening. Id.
268. Id.
269. William Branigin, Pilot Says U.S. Knew of Cuban MiGs; Lack of Aid Irks Leader
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requested that the U.S. Customs Service monitor flights out of
Florida, paying careful attention to possible violations of Cuban
airspace.
A Customs radar operator testified at a National
Transportation Safety Board hearing that at 3:15 p.m. he
identified two high-speed aircraft, the Cuban MiGs, breaking into
international airspace in the direction of the United States.27
The radar operator, Jeffrey Houlihan, contacted the Southeast
Air Defense Sector, located at Florida's Tyndall Air Force Base,
and was told, "We're handling it, don't worry."27' Houlihan
testified that U.S. jets could scramble and intercept within five to
ten minutes, but no craft were launched.272 Houlihan further
testified, "The United States military has told me specifically
that anything that appears in that area heading toward the U.S.,
they're going to launch on immediately."272 Colonel Samuel
Baptiste, the vice commander of the Southeast Air Defense
Sector, fielded inquiries from the press, stating that "day-in and
day-out procedures" were followed, and operational decisions
from that day had nothing to do with BTTR.'74
The United States had no duty to prevent BTTR's flights,
and neither the pilots nor BTTR would have had a viable cause of
action against the United States for its inaction. Under the
Court's unanimous decision in Collins v. Harker Heights,27 in
order for a plaintiff to state a constitutional cause of action
against government-as-government, that government must
demonstrate "deliberate indifference" towards the plaintiff.276
Where rights are defined as negative liberties, government has
277
no affirmative constitutional duty to take any action. In the
of 'Brothers' Who Lost 4, WASH. POST July 31, 1996, at A03. Basulto claimed that the
information fed to the State Department came from the Cuban double agent Roque. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. Colonel Baptiste would not specify how far north Cuban MiGs would be
allowed to fly before the Air Force would scramble and intercept. Id.
275. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
276. Kenneth M. Casebeer, The Empty State and Nobody's Market: The Political
Economy of Non-Responsibility and the Judicial Disappearing of the Civil Rights
Movement, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 247, 258 (2000).
277. Id. at 254-55, 258-59. See also, Searles v. SEPTA, 990 F. 2d 789, 793 (1993)
(failure to maintain a commuter train was not an affirmative act against plaintiffs);
Lewellen v. Metro Gov't of Nashville, 34 F. 345, 351 (1994) (school board that knowingly
exposed a contractor to an unreasonable danger did not violate constitutionally protected
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instant case, all agents of the United States are insulated from a
private action under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the Court's
decision in Rizzo v. Goode,27 which "does not, as a substantive
matter of law, require public actors to account for injuries
directly caused by other public individuals simply because the
injuries could have been prevented."27
The United States is further protected by the Court's
decision in Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv.,"'
where county social service workers, acting under state law, took
an injured child away from the custody of his abusive father. The
county department soon after returned the child to his abusive
father, and the child subsequently sustained a permanent injury.
The Court held that although the decision to return the child to
his abusive father was discretionary, the county was not the
cause of the child's specific injuries.28' The Court reasoned that
constitutional rights are negative orders to the government not to
do certain acts, thereby limiting the doctrine of due process to
"wrongs of intentional and strict causation."82 Furthermore, the
intervention of a subsequent actor relieves the state of
responsibility."3 Similarly in Alejandre, the shoot-down by the
Cuban Air Force actually relieved the United States of any
affirmative duty to the pilots or BTTR. Ironically, once the
Cuban Air Force attacked the planes, the United States was in
the clear. State inaction in this case did not constitute the state
action necessary in a claim for violation of due process.
IX. CONCLUSION
Cuba's attack was unjustified under international law. Even
so, Castro could not be arrested when he visited the United
States as Cuba's sitting head-of-state to address the United
Nations. The private diplomacy of BTTR and the flights over
Havana did not violate the Logan Act or the Neutrality Act,
despite affecting the relationship between the United States and
right because the defendants did not engage in arbitrary conduct intentionally designed to
punish someone).
278. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
279. Casebeer, supra note 276, at 276.
280. Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
281. Id. at 203.
282. Casebeer, supra note 276, at 297-98.
283. Id. at 298.
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Cuba.
Viewed in light of the history of U.S. activity directed against
the rule of Castro, the current prosecution of the remaining five
alleged Cuban agents effectively redirects the attention from
BTTR's assertion of U.S. responsibility to Cuban espionage. If
the United States had some part in supporting the flights by
BTTR, directly or indirectly, or if the United States seeks to
obfuscate the state's failure to intervene on behalf of the
murdered U.S. citizens and resident,8 4 the United States escapes
liability, but should not escape criticism.
JOSHUA SPECTOR*
284. Similarly if the policy thrust driving the current prosecution of the alleged
Cuban spies is to further damn Cuba in the international forum to muster international
support for the Helms-Burton Act.
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